announcer: learn more about the tennessee valley sunday at 4:00 p.m. eastern. announcer: harvard professor erez manela talks about woodrow wilson's american upbringing shaped his outlook on foreign policy as president, particularly his vision for the league of nations. about power and disorder this video is courtesy of the national world thei muted -- courtesy of national world war i museum in kansas city, missouri. is professor of

history at harvard university where he teaches international history and the history of the united states and the world. he serves as director of graduate programs at harvard's weatherhead center for international affairs and is cochair of harvard international global history seminar. he is coeditor of the global and international theories for cambridge university press. the volume "empires of war, 1911-1933." self-determination and the international origins of anti-colonial nationalism. will close our symposium with a lecture that explores how president wilson's ideas and convictions were formed, how they helped shape the 1919 peace settlement, and how that continues to impact us today.

dr. manela: thank you. i want to thank laura, matt and camille. all of the staff. everybody who has kept us organized, on and well fed for two days. this is the second time, as you mentioned, that i have worked with this group. youre been amazed by intellectual engagements and by your organizational wizardry. i would like to take a moment to put our hands together and thank the people who brought a seer. -- think the people

who brought us here. [applause] in december of 1918, u.s. president woodrow wilson arrived in britain en route to the peace conference and gathering in paris. during his time in london before he arrived in paris, wilson had an interview with the deputy chief sensor of great britain, frank worthington. in response to a question from worthington about close relations between great britain and the united states, wilson, according to worthington's notes told him the following. must not speak of us who come over here as cousins, less as brothers.

we are neither. neither must you think of us as anglo-saxon. that term can no longer be rightly applied to the people of the united states. there are only two things which can establish and maintain relations between your country on mine. community of ideals and interests." like aght seem surprising outlook to take for a man like wilson. all the more so because it ran against common perception amongst u.s. elites in the era. let me give you one example of an opposite perspective. some years earlier, the scottish american steel baron andrew carnegie published an essay in which he advocated that length thethe universe -- reunification of great britain

and north america. carnegie wondered why a mere disagreement over taxation -- [laughter]one that was more than a century old, should result in a permanent separation. in that essay, carnegie proceeded to offer six arguments for his proposed reunion of britain and america. first argument, and in carnegie's view of the most important was about race. "first, in race, there is a great deal in race. threeerican remains fourths purely british. there is some mixture of german, but that too is teutonic." [laughter] "the american remains british, remaining less from the british than the irishmen differ from each other. inis to be noted that only

the region of political ideas is there dissimilarity, for no rupture would never have taken place in language, religion or law." if we compare these two viewpoints, carnegie on one hand and wilson on the other, the difference is striking. britsrtier, americans and were one race separated by divergent political ideals. for wilson, they were different races -- "races." if they were to be united only by common ideals and interests. the divergence between view end wilsons is more striking if we consider that wilson, like carnegie, had deep roots in the british isles, specifically scotland. his paternal jan -- his paternal grandfather was a scotch-irish

immigrant to america from northern ireland. his maternal grandfather, thomas androw was born in scotland moved across the line to northern england, carlisle, where he headed a congregation and where woodrow wilson's mother was born before immigrating to america. wilson'se make of statement in 1918? it, ier to understand argue today, and more broadly in order to understand his thinking on post world war in general, we need to take into account not only wilson as the descendent of scottish immigrants, not even as many have done, the son of a minister and a devout presbytery and himself. every single u.s. president in history has professed to be a

christian. in this sense, wilson is not unique. we can stipulate that dove -- we can stipulate that some have done so more credibly than others. [laughter] nevertheless, they have all done it. cast our mindst to the -- in which wilson was unique. was is to recall that he the only president in the history of the united states who had earned a phd. perhaps why he is a favorite of many academics. he made a distinguished career in academia in the fields of history and politics, no less. what i want to argue today is that it is wilson as the academic that we need to think about when we try to reconstruct the intellectual capital he

a -- asto his career as for state domestic political leader, and then on the world's stage. let's begin with a biography. wilson was a product of the u.s. south. born in virginia, raised in georgia before and during the civil war. collegeon to attend the of new jersey, later renamed law at thend studied university of virginia before attempting to practice it in atlanta. bored out of his wits within a year, he decided to pursue the newlyolitics at established johns hopkins university in baltimore, maryland. been founded a few years before with the goal of importing the german university model of combining teaching with high-level research to the united states. this was a novel marvel at the

time for american colleges. of one of a member the first cohorts of americans to graduate in the united states with a phd, which he received in 1886 at the age of 30. by 1890, he landed back at princeton and had launched a successful career as an academic. stream ofed a steady books and essays on american politics and history and became a popular teacher. in 1902, he was appointed president of princeton. in the decade of his presidency of princeton is still seen as a time when that university was transformed from something of a finishing school into a serious research university. i recount these biographical details because i think they are important to the task i have taken on in this lecture. the task is to make the argument that in order to better ride --

in order to better understand ,ilson's ideas of war and peace to understand the international order wilson was trying to put together in paris, you must understand the origins of his thinking on the sources of order and disorder in social and political life in general. one way to think about it is that wilson's project, this is the alternate title of my presentation, to avert anarchy. i use anarchy into senses. -- i use the word anarchy in two senses. the first is the anarchy of war, world war i. the second is the anarchy of social disorder. specifically one that wilson would have associated with so-called "anarchists." a designation in which he would most likely have lumped socialists.

these two types of anarchy were tightly connected in the modern world. the remedy for them was tightly connected as well, that is to say the two types of anarchy, social disorder and war. the two senses were connected in his mind, we need to take stock of the intellectual capital wilson brought to his position as president. overal he had accumulated roughly three decades of his adult life prior to his entry into politics around 1910. i use the term "intellectual capital," kissinger was supposed to have said a decision-maker's -- don't have time in office to learn anything new. all of their decisions and outlooks when they are in office draw on the intellectual capital they had accumulated prior to taking that position.

capital," isctual what i'm trying to trace for you today. it was during these decades, two decades from the start of his to hise studies appointment to academic administration. roughly from 1880 to 1900 and most of the tumultuous -- span most of -- it is in that time wilson accumulated the intellectual capital. first as governor of new jersey from 1911-1913, and then president of the united states. wilson's thinking about politics, government and sources of social disorder and order are developed in the context of the domestic social political life

of the united states in the decades that preceded the war. only later was this scheme he developed applied to the international arena. it is the intellectual framework within which olson interpreted a transformation he saw around him. unfolding from 1880 on. his politicaled thought primarily during an era that we call the gilded age. time ofs, of course, a profound historic transformation. thisw all of you recall from high school, or perhaps later. i will go over this material quickly. what are these transformations? explainsd this help wilson's comment about americans no longer being called anglo-saxon, this is an era of large-scale immigration into the ended states.

1880-1910, some 20 million people arrived in the u.s. mostly from south and eastern europe. the 1910 census, 50% of the population were counted as foreign-born, higher than today. number one, immigration. number two, sweeping technological changes in the fields of communication. i like to tell my students that think the internet and social media have transformed our life that that revolution pales against the revolution of the telegraph. what happened then was information that until that time could only travel at the speed of the human being, whether mounted, running or walking or on a horse or ship, started to travel at the speed of light. that really is a revolution, i

think. that goes much further in many ways than what we have seen with the internet. revolution of communication. revolution of transportation with the steam engine for ships and rail and the internal combustion engine for automobiles. raised in born and the age of the horse and carriage. by the time he was president, he had a presidential automobile. not long after that they started building the mall next to which i am staying in kansas city, the country club plaza, which i am told was the first mall built in the united states to her because -- to accommodate customers coming by automobile. the third set of changes had to deal with the industrial revolution steam engines and so forth. rapid in this era a industrialization that by 1900 made the economy account for 25%

of all global industrial production. relatedly, maps of social dislocations. not just because of immigration but because of internal migration. the runaway growth of cities. relatedly we see reoccurring financial panics, as they were called at the time. wilson was living throughout this time as an adult. among all of this and as a inult, we see a steep rise inequality with strains on social fabric. i have to summarize how wilson himself saw the sum total of these changes in terms of their impact on society and politics. result of these changes was the rapid growth of unaccountable power concentrated in the hands of a few. the rapid growth of

unaccountable power concentrated in the hands of a few. a moralr him, was problem. it was also and more so a problem with practical politics. since, as he saw, the unaccountable transition of wealth and power as a historical phenomenon had to generate an in evitable counter reaction. namely, social unrest and revolution. say that if he were a marxist she would call it the dialectic. this is no theoretical reflection. those decades through which he lived into cumin aided -- accumulated capital were rife with social unrest, conflict, the rise of ideologies and movements. that led the ideology to the assassination of president william mckinley in september 1901.

this assassination was quite literally the historical event that brought progressivism to power because it brought mckinley's vice president, theodore roosevelt to the presidency. whenay i like to show this i teach about this in the classroom is to present these two threats to order, threats to democracy that wilson saw. recognize jp morgan representing the concentration of unaccountable power in the hands of the few. does anybody recognize the individual on the left? leo --, the assassin of president mckinley. representing the inevitable phenomenon that morgan represents. wilson, as he saw himself as a progressive, his job was to get in between those two and to hold the center to make sure that

problem oform, the unaccountable power can be ameliorated so that it does not lead to anarchy and revolution. the solution in wilson's political terms, which she articulated as a public intellectual and later as a leader was to push for a stronger role for government in the economy, particularly the executive branch, in order to be -- in order to break up trusts with the goal of restoring political balance and order. the eightrms include hour workday, limits on child labor and the founding of the federal reserve. yesterday theby federal reserve bank of kansas city, which i'm sure many of you are familiar with. even before the outbreak of the war, wilson could see this

dialectic between concentrated unaccountable power and --,lution play out not only but abroad. fact, the very first foreign policy crisis that wilson faced when he came into office as president, before the outbreak of world war i, was how to respond to the ongoing revolution in mexico. revolution had broken up in 1910 with the removal low of one strongman. when wilsonthough came into office they were on the cusp of inaugurating another military strongman into power. wilson responded, to the surprise of his british interlocutors by trying to support the liberals in mexico by imposing a arms embargo which quickly led to conflict that saw u.s. marines land in a mexican port.

ironically, while u.s. actions did actually help liberals in mexico, and ended up with the removal of that strongman who was in power at the time, they also turned liberals at the same time against the u.s. since no faction in mexico wished to be associated with the yankee military intervention. tensions in the real sony and operating procedure abroad is obvious in the mexican case. which had its own republican revolution in 1911, wilson saw the same dynamic at play. the late dynasty representing a ticket -- representing unaccountable power and the revolution representing reaction. wilson's policy toward china rotated from trying to tip the scales in the direction he favored with decidedly mixed results. once the great war broke out,

wilson finds the dialectic at work there. the connection between concentrated unaccountable power on one hand and peace, order and revolution on the other. on the world stage, it was the ar who and the russian cz represented unaccountable color -- represented unaccountable power. the exact kind of power that would incite revolution. one reason wilson kept us -- for the u.s. out of work the first three years is that he zar was on the wrong side of history. this is also why when the revolution in russia replaced r, wilson recognized the

new government within a week. change in the russian government, this is after the removal of the czar but before the bolshevik takeover. this change also played a role in wilson's decision to take the u.s. into war the following month. isch is when the czar removed, april is when the u.s. goes to work. the alliesar gone, became less stained by autocracy. what about the british, french and american empires? at that time, those were also prime examples of unaccountable power, exercise on the world stage. we will get to that a bit later. case, the bolshevik takeover in russia in november calculus changed the and also proved to wilson that

he was right. wilson knew little of lenin at the time but new enough not to have any sympathy at all for his program. my precisely the sort of revolution that was bound to come of the persistence as occurred in russia under the concentrated power. it is worth noting that wilson and lennon agreed on some things. thatshare the sense established order had to be transformed in order to make power more accountable. be on that, they parted ways. was wilson was looking for a third way between reaction on one hand and revolution on the , the choice was started i think you have reaction defined by capitalism or revolution. there was, for lenin, no third way.

the slide i used to represent wilson's conundrum abroad. power,ser representing lenin representing the inevitable revolutionary response to power, and wilson coming into the war and coming to paris to try to hold the fort against both of these threats. what were the main components of this wilsonian third way in the context of the paris peace conference? simply, the league of nations and the principle of self-determination let's take each of them in order. let's examine them in the context of this framework i have set up. the crucial point here is that in wilson's original conception

of the league, it was not simply to be a body that would coordinate among individual sovereign nationstates, which is what became later. rather in his original conception, it was to be an instrument in which states would pool some aspects of their respective sovereignties. not unlike the european union. i should say the european union before brexit. we will see how that goes. case, supranational political structure in which nationstates would pool sovereignty. league, one the relatedly an organization that would make the power of sovereign states and state's people more accountable to what wilson liked to call world opinion. hence helping to solve the problem, or at least ameliorate the problem of unaccountable power.

draftis evidence from the of the leak covenant that wilson himself drew up after the armistice and took with him to europe to the public statements he made to the public when he came back from europe, that show that this was the way he wanted. that was precisely henry cabot's lodge. but, doesn't that idea of pooling sovereignties in an international organization stand in conflict with self-determination? is also associated and seems to suggest at least the sanctity of national sovereignty -- how can national sovereignty can be sacred and also pooled? i would say the contrary. such pooling of sovereignties as

wilson wadded could, he thought, only work in a way that was accountable to the people involved. a -- took took into into account self-determination. for wilson, it was never about creating ethnically homogenous policies. borrowed the term self-determination from bolshevik rhetoric in order to try to de-fame the bolshevik threat by partially co-opting it. to trick used himself prior the revolution was consent of the governed. that was his term of art. it goes back to several centuries of anglo-american political thought. started using the term self-determination, when he became identified with it, i have never been able to find an instance in the documents where wilson specifically defines the

to -- the termination. national self-determination. that is a phrase he never used. and trotsky-- lenin always talked about national self-determination. they were very specific. the reason was that wilson knew very well he was working from the american model and knew very well as we can see from his statement that the united states homogenousethnically -- and if it were to have self-determination, was to be exercised through the consent of the government -- consent of the governed, not through the process of ethnic homogeneity. that national self-determination took in europe and to some extent asia after the war, that is to say,

ethnic cleansing, that was not a wilsonian idea. as i was saying, it was not about creating a thick movie -- it was not about creating ethnically, jenae days, it was about government. the concentration of unaccountable power. this was the theory. wilson was first and foremost, despite having an phd, a practical politician which means he made many compromises driven both by his own inconsistencies of prejudice, and also the design and interest of others who had power over the course of events. we heard quite a bit about those from margaret lynn last night.

-- margaret mcmillan. there are examples we can think of, but perhaps the most illustrative is the league of mandates system -- the league of reformit was intended to imperial rule beyond europe. the mandate system was a compromise with influence from other allies who had no intention of letting go of their imperial possessions in the name of accountable government or self-determination. it was also a compromise ownnding of wilson's prejudice. the people of asia, africa and the middle east were somehow less advanced in their political development than people of northern european descent, and therefore had to be prepared or tutored for self-government. still, even with this league ofd state, the

nations mandate system challenged in principle the absolute sovereignty of colonial powers over their colonies by making them explicitly accountable through an international authority. followtem did not colonialism immediately, did not intend to. that would have been revolution and wilson was not a revolutionary. legitimacylenge the of the colonial enterprise saying essentially the main purpose of colonial rule was to prepare colonial peoples for independence. the main purpose was to make itself unnecessary. , the mandate system, colonial populations in a system whose purpose was to make government more accountable to them. accountability wilson

viewed as key. what wilson wanted and why, but we should also emphasize his wartime rhetoric resonated beyond its intended rhetoric wasd that given meaning that went well beyond his own plans and intentions. wilson may have wanted reform as a bulwark, but too many who quote him, his words and opportunities they appear to create have revolutionary, rather than reformist and blick asians. -- reformist applications. have heardups, as we a number of times, both within and outside europe projected their fondness -- their fondest hopes and dreams. his words helped inspire and mobilize movements and regions from north africa to east asia including korea, and those who

want to read a book about that, it is in the bookstore. [laughter] failure to make good on his perceived promises of self-determination led some anti-colonial activists look tog ho chi minh to bolshevism for inspiration and support. it is no accident the chinese, founded in 1921. after 1919, self-determination became a central principle of international legitimacy. roosevelt, who had served in the wilson administration as assistant secretary of the navy during the war and during peace negotiations, spent a few days in paris as part of the u.s. delegation.

franklin roosevelt recommitted the united states to that principle of self-determination during world war ii when he compelled the reluctant winston churchill to include it explicitly in the atlantic charter. churchill had to go back to london and explain to everyone why that did not apply to india and other british possessions. took it further, this principle that wilson had, particularly as it applied to territories outside of europe. is research i'm working on now, so i can talk about it at length for those who are interested. of support for the emergence self determining nations and their incorporation into institutions of international the two mainre elements of the international order that the united states did go on to establish at the end of world war ii. can i say world war ii here at the world war i museum?

[laughter] sufficientlyt account for the tension at the center for u.s. advocacy. the tension is this, what if a having gained self-determination, determines to take a path that is not aligned with u.s. interests? when theou choose principal for self-determination clashes with other principles and interests you hold dear? by the 1940's, washington shows what it saw as the containment of communism over support for colonial self-determination, most prominently when it shows to back the french were against the vietminh in indochina. when the french lost the war, the united states took it over itself. vietnam is just one example. throughout postwar decades,

post-world war ii, the principle of support for self-determination remains prominent in rhetoric and self-image even while its policy often flouted in in practice in or otherof containment pressing concerns and interests. where does that leave us? first, i hope i have convinced you that in order to understand what wilson came to europe to do , we must take account of the intellectual capital he applied. over twoe built up decades of thinking and writing about u.s. politics. his analysis of the conditions of modernity in which americans found themselves by the time he theelected was centered on desire to escape the dialectic that he saw playing out between the concentration of unaccountable power and the dangers of revolution.

once he came to the presidency, he applied this framework to world problems, first in mexico and china, then europe and the world at large. if i have convinced you of all this come i have to say the legacy is complicated. in one sense, i know i am going against the grain here, wilson succeeded. the league of nations was in fact founded, several new independent states arose from the wreckage of fallen empires pursuant to the principles of self-determination. in another sense, he clearly failed. he could not convince the senate to ratify the treaty. the u.s. remained outside the league and the league itself was but a shadow of what he imagined. moredetermination proved complicated not only in its attainment but also in its use.

sense,in a limited the blueprintme for the construction of the u.s. led liberal international order, undergirdedt had international relations and defined international relations for the best -- for the better part of a century. whether it is still is there to define our future, i am not sure. this, itabout highlights the tensions and contradictions that were embedded in such a project as wilson had undertaken from the outset. us that it is an order, a deliberate order that is facing unprecedented challenges at home and abroad. so also under

circumstances that are eerily reminiscent of those over a century geico -- over a century ago. easy to sees too ourselves as undergoing a new gilded age with accelerated globalization, large-scale andration, rapid economic technical change creating social dislocations, a steep rise in inequality that is challenging long-standing social contracts and institutions both u.s. and abroad, and the rican's of concentrated unaccountable power. not unlike a world that wilson saw himself in an the 20th century, a world in which we are speaking globally, not cousins. less brothers. yet, continue to search for a way to build "a community of ideals and interests." thank you. [applause]

>> we will open to -- we will open the floor to your questions. >> that was fascinating. if i could pick up on your theme wilsonian failures, i am thinking it didn't have much to do with his intellectual capital, but more his character. he was, as far as i could tell, very stubborn, self-righteous, and this was a major factor why he was not able to persuade others of the value of his thinking and intellectual capital and ideas. is a great that question. for me, it is not an either-or proposition, it is both-and. his i allowed and his character as well. wilson, both as

governor and president, for most of his two terms was actually quite an effective and compelling politician. he was able to convince a lot of people of a lot of things, not least with his war rhetoric. he was able to convince people around the world that he was the man to make change that they wanted to see in their own affairs and world affairs. failure at the end of his career is undoubted. that has to do with his character and also from a there is research on this which is interesting, the deterioration of his health. as i'm sure you know, in october 1919 he had a major stroke which essentially put him out of commission. it is likely he had minor strokes and months prior to that. that didn't invert his character, but made him perhaps more stubborn and less flexible.

counterfactual history is hard to do, it is impossible to know for sure what to have happened had those strokes. it is not difficult to imagine he would have been able to reach a compromise. henry -- was a harvard man. that might have been doomed to fail to begin with. the versailles treaty with the league of nations did garner a notrity in the senate, just the two thirds required for ratification. i think it is not implausible to think a healthier wilson would have been able to convince the ,enate to go through with it maybe then we have a different assessment of his legacy. >> i am intrigued by how you are

ism and thesonian idea of anarchy. i can't hel's but think of woodrow wilson's writings about the reconstruction era. aboutyou maybe talk more that and make the connection aboutn how he is writing conceptualizing reconstruction and how he has been applying that to his ideas of self-determination, particularly as it relates to colonized peoples in asia and africa. dr. manela: that is a great question. i am not qualified for psychoanalysis. i can't say for sure whether wilson's experience in the u.s. civil war was one of the elements that the basis of his fear of anarchy. i would not be surprised if it was.

the boy who grows up in antebellum, virginia and south carolina, suddenly the whole world falls apart. be part ofvery well the explanation for his fear of anarchy and anarchism meant for his attachment there to this idea of reform, gradual nonviolent change. i would like to call it a strategy of containment. the ideas to contain revolution and disorder, and to do it -- as a historian, he knew history always involved change. you can't do it by keeping things static. the only thing he could think of was reform and nonviolent change. question,ly to your what he realizes, the echoes his rhetoric has in part of the colonial world, his response is mixed. on one hand, he has no particular support or love for

this european territorial imperialism. on the other hand, he has a greater fear of anarchy and disorder. let's take the example of the egyptian uprising in 1919 against british rule. first, the united states puts out -- the state department puts out mildly supportive statements, or appears to. houseitish go to colonel and say look, it is your president's faulty egyptians are rising up. they think he is bringing self determination and it is bringing chaos. when reports come from egypt that some of the protesters are being violent, knocking down telegraph lines so that the infrastructure of imperialism. wilson heroes that and never thes all that much about self-determination of nonwhite people because his instinct is

that -- even without knowing anything about egypt his instinct is they are not prepared for it. there is a history there with wilson's policy in the philippines for re--- where he has the approach of gradual self-government. -- in regardssh to egypt that his words helped violence, he backed -- he backtracks. the state department issues a statement where they say we are sympathetic toward egyptian desires for more self-government, but we are opposed to violence and disorder. that is not the right way to go about things. the mandate system encapsulates precisely what you are alluding to. there is the end goal of independence, but that has to go through all of these different stages and needs to be reformist and nonviolent. >> we have time for two more questions.

we will be closed out by dr. proctor. about possiblelk u.s. mandates in the middle east. how serious did those discussions get? is there much documentation of what wilson's general reaction to those proposals were? of mynela: to the best recollection, the biggest part of the conversation about possible u.s. mandate was over armenia. already heard actually, the ian's presentation, armenian genocide was a very well-publicized in the united states during the war. henry morgantown, the u.s. minister to east end bowl who , whoted -- to istanbul reported back and was an associate of wilson. my sense of it is that wilson was sympathetic toward this idea but it was not a high priority for him.

the he got the sense that u.s. public was not going to be supportive of an ongoing -- it would have required ongoing military presence in that conflict in asia minor. was that the united states could not do it. it petered out. the other elements with the mandates is the famous king crane commission. some circles. the united states sense -- sends to parts of the middle east, lebanon, syria, jordan and palestine, they meet with literally hundreds of delegations there and get their views about what should be done and basically their view is, we want an american mandate. if we can't have independence, we want an american mandate. if we can't have an american mandate, maybe we could live with a french mandate -- british

mandate, definitely not a french mandate. what happened with the commission was by the time they write this great report, they come back and to deliver it, the united states has just left the middle east and margaret mcmillan was referring to this, left the middle east to the british and the french in the report was buried and never published. thank you. that was great. pictured almost float a in the middle of hoover too, who was politically opposite in so many ways, but they are working together during the war. he is making the same argument about why she'd europe. avoid social revolution. did will some convincing -- did wilson convince him of this, or

is wilson shaping it? dr. manela: that is a great question. it reminds me i need to emphasize, i am making no claim that wilson was an original political thinker and the ideas i described were original to him. this is not the case at all. he was reflecting a fairly broad sensibility among americans, progressive says we would call them at the time. what makes wilson stand out is of course he had a great deal more power than these other individuals, particularly in 1919 when he comes to power, as we see in the mural upstairs. he is at the center of everything. germans want armistice, so they go to wilson. they don't go to the french. it is his power that distinguishes him, rather than his ideas. he is in the best place to put these ideas into implementation.

kind of ar does is difference between humanitarian aid and political change. hoover is worried about revolution and he says we will feed these people, and we will stem the tide of revolution temporarily. i am not saying that wilson is a better thinker than hoover, but he is positioned differently. olson has a different place in the firmament. thinking about the long-term political requirements too, in his view, stem the revolutionary tide, restore order through reform and accountability. it does not surprise me at all that there was overlap in their thinking. i do not know if you would call hoover a progressive but there are shared aspects in that thinking. thanking join me in dr. erez manela.

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